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What kind of field is AI? 
Alan Bundy 
I want to ask 'What kind of field is artificial intelligence?' and to give an 
answer. Why is this an important question? Because there is evidence 
within AI of a methodological malaise, and part of the reason for this 
malaise is that there is not a generally agreed answer to the question. 
As an illustration, several papers in this volume draw a number of 
different analogies between artificial intelligence and other fields. AI is 
compared to physics, to chemical engineering, to thermodynamics and to 
psychology; in fact it is said to be psychology. Each of these is a very 
different kind of field with different kinds of methodology, criteria for 
assessing research and so on. Depending on which of these you think 
artificial intelligence is really like, you would decide what to do, how to do 
it , and how to assess other pe<Jple's work. 
1 Evidence of malaise 
One of the symptoms of this malaise is a difference amongst 
referees of papers as to the standard which is expected for conferences, 
journals, etc. When I was programme chairman ofa major AI conference, I 
noted that for more than 50 percent of the papers the referees disagreed as 
to whether the papers should be accepted or rejected. And this wasn't just a 
question of having different thresholds of acceptability, because the opin-
ions would reverse on other kinds of papers. So clearly the referees were 
applying very different criteria when deciding which papers were worth 
accepting. 
A second symptom of this malaise, which has been noted for instance by 
D. McDermott (1981), is the fragility of programs. Typically they run on the 
example in the thesis or paper, and in the words of Bobrow et al. (1977), on 
other examples they simulate total aphasia or death. 
A third symptom is the poverty of published accoants. Some people have 
alluded to this in their criticism of papers about expert systems, where it is 
particularly prevalent. For instance, a paper describing an expert system for 
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diagnosing bee diseases, might concentrate ~n the nature and impo~tanc~ of 
bee diseases. At the end of the paper you might find the statement I built a 
rule based system' or 'I built a blackboard architecture', but that is all you 
learn about how the program actually worked. It is very difficult to build on 
and extend such work. 
That leads me to my fourth symptom: that there is often a lack of 
continuity in Al research. There are in AI traditions of building on a 
sequence of programs, or a sequence of techniques, and the_se a.re honour-
able exceptions, but often one gets a one-off program which is then not 
continued in any way. . 
Part of the solution to this malaise is to identify what kind of field AI is. It 
is not the only answer, there are other aspects of the problem, but I don't 
want to dwell on these here. 
2 Kinds of AI 
One difficulty is that there are a number of different kinds of AI, 
each one of which has its own criteria and methodology. These tend to get 
confused together, so that different people have different conceptions of 
what kind of a field AI is. I want to disentangle the confusion by separating 
out the different kinds of Al. 
The different kinds of Al correspond to different motivations for doing 
Al. The first kind, which has become very popular in the past five to ten 
years, is applied Al, 1 where we use existing Al for commercial tech-
niques, military or industrial applications, i.e. to build products. A~other 
· kind of AI is to model human or animal intelligence using AI techniques. 
This is called cognitive science, or computational psychology. T_hose t~o 
kinds of Al have often been identified in the past, but there is a third 
kind on which I want to concentrate most of my attention. I call it basic 
Al.2 
The aim of basic AI is to explore computational techniques which have 
the potential for simulating intelligent behaviour. 
3 What is an Al technique? 
All these definitions rely on a notion of AI technique so it is 
necessary for me to say something about what an AI technique is_. I wi_ll be 
fairly catholic about this. The obvious ~andidat~ f~r an Al t~chmque is an 
algorithm. An example would be the c1rcumscnpt1on technique that John 
McCarthy has developed for non-monotonic reasoning. An olde~ example 
would be means-ends analysis. The boundaries between Al algonthms an~ 
other more conventional kinds of algorithms in computer science is obvi-
ously very fuzzy. One should not expect or attempt to draw a hard and fast 
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boundary, but it is something to do with the potential of these techniques 
for simulating intelligent behaviour in a wide sense. 
There are other kinds of techniques in AI, for instance, techniques for 
representing knowledge (e.g. situation calculus, frame systems, semantic 
nets). Even the new work on connectionism may be thought of as the 
development of new AI knowledge representation techniques. 
On a wider front there are architectures for AI systems. The best example 
I can think of here is the blackboard architecture, but this is not a very 
precisely defined technique. Getting precise notions of architecture is an 
area of weakness in AI. There are probably some good ideas around which 
need tightening up and given more precise form. 
Lastly, there are a collection of techniques for knowledge elicitation, for 
instance, protocol analysis. Notice that protocol analysis is not just a 
cognitive science technique; it has found application in expert systems. 
Knowledge elicitation techniques are also used in basic AI as a source o f 
inspiration when developing new ideas. 
4 An analogy with mathematics and physics 
In order to sharpen up this three-fold division of AI I want to 
draw an analogy with other kinds of science. I also want to show that AI is 
not essentially different from other kinds of science . My analogy is drawn 
from mathematics and physics because they are classic sciences with which 
most of us are familiar, although one could draw analogies with other areas 
of science. In my analogy, computer science is similar to mathematics, basic 
AI is similar to applied mathematics and also to pure engineering, applied 
AI is similar to engineering, cognitive science is similar to theoretical 
physics, and psychology is similar to physics. 
The idea is that physics and psychology are natural sciences, i.e. 
psychologists and physicists both try to study and model real world 
phenomena. Mathematics and computer science provide an armoury of 
techniques for building theories and/or models for these natural sciences. In 
applied mathematics and basic AI, people study those techniques of 
mathematics and computer science which are particularly useful for modell-
ing in these natural sciences. So, in applied mathematics , one might study 
those partial differential equations which have proved useful for modelling 
h!drodynamics. In basic Al, one might study inference techniques like 
circumscription, frames, blackboard architectures, etc., which have been 
found to be useful for modelling intelligence. Then one can take those 
~echniques and build commercial products with them . That is what is done 
tn engineering and in applied AI. 
. S~mewhere between the natural science of physics and applied mathema-
tics is_ the area of theoretical physics, where scientists are concerned with 
applying the modelling techniques of applied mathematics to account for 
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the observations of physical phenomena. Similarly, cognitive scientists are 
concerned to apply the modelling techniques of basic Al to account for 
observations of intelligent behaviour. 
It is also possible to draw an analogy between AI and engineering. 
Sometimes engineers are concerned with building particular houses or 
particular bridges or synthesizing particular chemi~als, ~ut they ~re also 
interested in developing new, general-purpose engmeermg techniques. I 
will call this activity pure engineering. An example is a study of new 
structures for building bridges without an attempt to build a particular 
bridge. Another example is a study of reinforced concrete in which the 
engineer develops various methods of doing the reinforcing and then 
subjects each method to a batch of tests to discover its ageing and str.ength 
characteristics. Similarly, in basic Al, researchers develop new techniques, 
test them and find out their interrelationships. These techniques can then be 
used in applied Al or in cognitive science. . . 
The reason that it is possible to have this analogy both with applied 
mathematics and with pure engineering is that computer programs are 
strange beasts; they are both mathematical entities and artifacts. They are 
formal abstract objects, which can be investigated symbolically as if they 
were statements in some branch of mathematics. But they are also artifacts, 
in that they can do things, e.g. run a chemical plant. They are machines, but 
they are not physical machines, they are mental machines (Bundy, 1981) . I 
think it is interesting that applied mathematics and pure engineering should 
turn out to be similar kinds of fields. 
5 Is Al a science? 
Whether Al is a science depends on the kind of AI and what is 
meant by science. We can identify two kinds of science: natural scienc.e and 
engineering science. In a natural science, we study some phenomena.In the 
world and try to discover theories about them. Examples of natural sciences 
are physics, chemistry, biology and psychology. In an engineering sci~nce, 
we develop techniques and discover their properties and relat1?ns. 
Examples of engineering sciences are pure engineering and ma~hemat1cs. 
Cognitive science is a natural science. It is the study of the m~nd and the 
attempt to build theories of the mind with the aid of computational tools. 
Part of this study is the building of computer programs to model aspects.of 
mental behaviour, and the comparison of the behaviour of the program with 
that of real minds. 
Basic AI is an engineering science. It consists of the development of 
computational techniques and the discovery of their properties and inter-
relations. Part of this study is the building of comput.er progra~s tha~ 
embody these techniques to: extend them, explore then properties, an 
generally discover more about them. 
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It makes sense to ask whether the theories of cognitive science are true, 
i .e. whether they accurately describe real minds. It does not make sense to 
ask whether the techniques of basic AI are true, any more than it would 
make sense to ask whether differentiation, group theory or internal 
combustion were true. It does make sense to ask whether properties of and 
relationships between techniques are true, e.g. whether negation as failure 
is a special case of circumscription, whether resolution is complete. 
6 Criteria for assessing basic AI research 
If you accept the analogy to physics and mathematics and the 
three-fold division of AI into basic AI, applied AI and cognitive science, 
what is the payoff? The analogy suggests criteria for assessing research in 
each kind of AI. It suggests how to identify what constitutes an advance in 
the subject and it suggests what kind of methodology AI researchers might 
adopt. 
In demonstrating this I will concentrate on basic AI. It is also impor-
tant to do this kind of exercise for applied AI and for cognitive science, 
but it is less urgent for these two because people have already thought 
about criteria for assessing research aimed at applications and psychologi-
cal modelling. There has not been so much thought about criteria for 
assessing research in which AI techniques are developed for their own 
sake. In the case of appl ied AI there is a major criterion that what you 
build is in fact a successful commercial product which fills a need. In the 
case of cognitive science there are acid tests about doing experiments to 
see if the model exhibits all and only the behaviour that has been 
observed in humans or animals. In basic AI it is not so obvious what the 
criteria are. 
Here are some criteria. I drew up this list by starting with particular 
criticisms of existing AI research and then generalizing and negating them. 
Although I have asserted that there is widespread disagreement about the 
virtues of AI research illustrated by the disagreements among referees 
about research papers, there is, in fact, considerable agreement about the 
s~ortcomings. People will often agree what is wrong with a piece of work 
without agreeing what is right. So this methodology of negating criticisms is 
a productive one. 
The criteria discovered in this way are similar to the criteria used to assess 
the techni~ue_s of any engineering science. ~his corroboration lends support 
to the cntena themselves and to the classification of basic AI as an 
engineering science. 
M~ first criterion is clarity . The technique should be describable in a 
~rectse way, independent of any program that implements it, so that it is 
simple to understand. Logical calculi are often useful as a language of 
de · · scnphon. They are not the only language; diagrams are another. Con-
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sider the way in which minimax is usually explained: in terms of backing up 
scores in a game tree. Counter-examples can be found in papers that explain 
what a program does, but say nothing about how it does it, or in papers that 
describe a program only by describing how each Lisp function works. I have 
put clarity first because it is a necessary first step before one can go on to 
investigate the properties of the technique. 
My second criterion is the power of the technique. A technique is judged 
to be more valuable if it has a wide range of application and if it is efficient in 
its operation. A typical counter-example is the Ph.D. program that works 
on the toy example in the thesis, but which either does not work at all or 
runs out of resources on other examples. If that is wrong then what is right is 
that the program should work on lots of examples and the more the better, 
and that it should work fast and use little space. 
My third criterion is parsimony. Other things being equal, the technique 
which is simpler. to describe should get more credit. This is often neglected 
in Al, but Occam's Razor ought to apply to AI techniques as much as it 
applies to other sciences. A counter-example would be an excessively 
complex program for some task where no principled attempt had been 
made to build a simple program for the same task. 
My fourth criterion is complete11ess, i.e. that the work should be finished 
in some sense. For instance, a computer program should be finished and 
sliould work. We can all think of counter-examples to that. Similarly, a 
knowledge-representation formalism should be capable of representing the 
kinds of knowledge that it was intended to represent. Were it not for the 
counter-examples, this criterion might be thought too obvious to be worth 
stating. 
My fifth, and last, criterion is correctness, i.e. that the program should 
behave as req uired, that the proofs of any theorems about the technique 
should be correct, etc. 
7 Advances in basic AI 
Given that basic AI consists of the invention and development of 
techniques, we can identify what constitutes an advance in the field. An 
obvious advance would be the invention of a new technique. Its merits can 
be judged according to the criteria listed in the last section. Of course, it is 
also an advance if a technique is improved along one of the dimensions 
defined by these criteria, i.e. if it is made more clear, powerful, parsimo-
nious, complete or correct. 
In assessing the merit of an advance, one must also take into acc~~nt ~o~ 
different a new technique is from previous techniques, how surpnsmg it ts 
that it can be stated so clearly, parsimoniously or completely or correctly, or 
that it turns out to be so powerful. We can summarize this as the novelty of 
the advance. 
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But advances can also come from an improved understanding of the 
properties of, or relationships between techniques. For instance, 
a proof that a technique obeys some specification, e.g. the soundness 
and completeness proofs for resolution; 
the discovery of the complexity of a technique; 
a demonstration that one technique is a special case of another 
technique; 
a demonstration that what appears to be one technique in the literature, 
turns out, under closer examination, to be two or three slightly different 
techniques whiclt deserve different names; 
or, vice versa, that two or more apparently different techniques are 
essentially the same; 
a demonstration that a technique applies to a new domain; 
an exploration of the behaviour of a technique on a range of standard 
examples. 
Again we want to use the novelty of the advance as one measure of its 
merit. 
8 A methodology for basic AI 
What methodology does this suggest for basic AI? To answer 
this question we have to take a partly descriptive and a partly normative 
stance, that is, we need to see what methodology is actually followed in AI 
and then see what modifications to this methodology are suggested by our 
analysis. The major methodology in AI is exploratory programming; one 
chooses some task which has not been modelled before, and then, by a 
process of trial and error programming, develops a program for doing this 
task. Suppose you want to build a program which can suggest new Chinese 
recipes, then you might set to work developing such a program. You will 
~ream up a scenario of how a particular recipe might be generated, 
tm?leme?t the. procedure this suggests, and then test it on further examples. 
!hts te~tmg will show up inadequacies and suggest ways of modifying and 
tmprovmg the program. This trial and error cycle will continue until you are 
satisfied with the program. 
At this stage there ought to be an analysis of the program in order to try to 
tease out in a rnore precise way the techniques which underlie it. Suppose 
tha~ the Chinese recipe program works by matching some set of ingredients 
~gamst an existing list of recipes and trying to get a close match. So mew here 
in the program there must be some kind of analogical matching routine. 
Careful analysis of the program will reveal what form it takes. 
It is quite likely that this analogical matching technique will be ad hoc and do~ain specific. So the next step is to generalize and to formulate a 
ratzonally reconstructed algorithm which does the same thing but is more 
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robust. We then need to explore the properties of this rationally recon-
structed technique according to the list given in the last section, ~.e. 
construct a specification and verify the technique.' discover its c?mplex1ty, 
explore its relationship to other techniques, apply 1t to new domains and test 
it on standard examples. This exploration will suggest further general-
izations and improvements. . . . 
Analysis should also help identify the weaknesses of ex1stmg techrnques 
and hence suggest what problems we should focus on in the future. Where 
the weaknesses cannot readily be met by the extension of existing tech-
niques then they might be address.ed. by expl~ratory pr?gramming. A task 
must be identified for which the ex1stmg techmques are inadequate because 
of these weaknesses, and where there is some prospect that progress might 
be made. An attempt should then be made to build a program for this task. 
Thus the methodology cycles. 
These latter steps in the methodology of AI - of analysis, generalization, 
rational reconstruction and exploration of properties - are not generally 
recognized or practised. It follows from my analysis of b~sic AI that they are 
very important and that they deserve a lot more attention. 
9 C()nclusion 
To sum up: the malaise which I have identified in ~I can ~e 
cured, in part, by careful definition and sub-division of the field in~o ba~1c 
AI, applied AI and cognitive science. For each ki~d of Al we. can identify 
different sets of criteria for assessing research, different notions of what 
constitutes an advance and different methodologies for conducting 
research. I have identified these for basic AI. If we do not subdivide the field 
then these criteria and methodologies become entangled, leading to a 
confusion in the way that AI research is conducted and judged. 
This is not to suggest that there are not researchers with multiple motives 
who would like to contribute to more than one kind of AI, and that there are 
not pieces of work which do contribute to more than one ~ind of AL 
Judging such work is difficult, but it can be done b~ ~epar~tmg out the 
work's contributions to basic AI, applied AI and cogmt1ve science. 
Notes 
1 Elsewhere (Bundy, 1983) I have called it tech11ological Al. 
2 Elsewhere (Bundy, 1983) I have called it mainstream Al. 
Programs in the search for 
intelligent machines: the 
mistaken foundations of AI 
Eric Dietrich 
Of course, unless one has a theory, one cannot expect much help from a 
computer (unless it has a theory). Marvin Minsky 
1 Introduction 
Computer programs play no single role in artificial intelligence. 
To some, programs are an end; to others, they are a means. These two 
groups might be thought to contain those who think AI is an engineering 
discipline, and those who think AI is a science. This is only partially true; 
the real situation is more complicated. 
The first group is by far the largest and contains many of the most 
prominent Al researchers. For example, in his book Problem Solving 
Methods in Artificial Intelligence, Nils Nilsson states that 
Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the develop-
ment of both practical and theoretical knowledge . . . As regards 
theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial 
intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an 
engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (1971, 
pp. vii-1•iii, his emphasis) 
~arr and Feigenbaum (taking a slightly more cautious position) also 
claim ~hat "whether ornot [AI leads] to a better understanding of the mind, 
there 1s every evidence that [AI] will lead to a new intelligent technology" 
(1981/1982, p. 3, their emphasis). 
Many researchers who see themselves as theorists or scientists also 
belong in this group because they think that the ultimate goal of their work 
on theor~ is to produce a computer program that does something useful, 
whereas mother disciplines, tbe goal of theorists and scientists is to produce 
a theory: Roger Schank, for example, in the preface to Conceptual 
Information Processing (1975a) states 
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